Review: Luke Skywalker and the Shadows of Mindor (Star Wars)
By Matthew Stover. ISBN 978-0-345-47744-6
By Matthew Stover. ISBN 978-0-345-47744-6
By Rajiv Chandrasekaran. ISBN 1-4000-4487-1The second half of the book, in which the CPA (nicknamed "Can't Produce Anything" by the U.S. military forces within the Green Zone) eats humble pie time and time again, is bookended by violence. It opens with the October 26, 2003 rocket attacks against the Al-Rasheed hotel, which shattered the illusion of peace and safety from within the fortified Green Zone, and more or less ends with two crucial military engagements: the March 19, 2004 ambush of three Army humvees in Sadr City that followed Bremer's decision to silence al-Sadr's Al-Hawza newspaper and the all-out assault on the city of Fallujah in April 2004 launched in retaliation for the brutal deaths of four defense contractors. Chandrasekaren does find a few positive forces in the mix. Jim Otwell, the outspoken and pragmatic fight fighter from Buffalo, separated the fight directorate from the corrupt police force and got funding to replace the equipment damaged in the initial looting. Because of his work with the firefighter's union in upstate New York gave him the most experience with labor relations in the CPA, he is tasked to be the interim minister of labor and social affairs. In this role, he fought to stop food subsidies from being monetized: the women handled the food rations, he noticed, and there would be no guarantee that the men would spend the equivalent money as efficiently. Steve Browning, a specialist with the Army Corps of Engineers, was put in charge of four ministries in the immediate aftermath of the war. As head of the health ministry, he got generators for all the Iraqi hospitals. Despite not being an electricity expert, he was tasked with restoring electrical output to pre-war levels, and accomplished it in just over two months. But for the most part, the second half of the book chronicles the idealistic but unqualified and unrealistic CPA staffers butting up against the entrenched Iraqi status quo and the consequences of their own incompetence. Browning's plan for future development of the electrical grid, for instance, envisioned small power plants close to communities, so the locals would have an incentive not to sabotage them. Instead, the CPA decided on massive power plants that became targets for insurgent attacks and were still uncompleted when sovereignty was handed back to the Iraqis. His replacement at the Health Ministry envisioned a system of local clinics and unsubsidized medicine while the hospitals lacked sterile conditions and basic equipment. In the epilogue, nonpartisan diplomats and technocrats from the State Department with local expertise and fluency in Arabic take over as the Republican Palace becomes America's largest embassy, but in Chandrasekaren's view it's too little, too late. "If this place succeeds," one CPA employee told the author amid departure preparations, "it will be in spite of what we did, not because of it."